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The jury is still out on the need for government-organized ca-
pacity markets in order to achieve e¢ cient long-run investments
in electricity generation. When new capacity markets are intro-
duced, however, it is important that they are well designed and
take account of existing experience and previous design failures.
Experience in both Colombia and New England provide a stark
warning about the dangers of placing descending clock auctions
at the center of electricity capacity markets. Among alternative
auction design options, a sealed-bid auction is a better choice.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade, electricity capacity markets have been introduced in New
England, the PJM, Western Australia and Colombia, and are currently being
considered in Germany, Texas, Italy and Peru. In the UK, the Department
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has recently conrmed a design for
Britains rst electricity generation capacity auction to be held in December
2014 for delivery of new capacity in 2018.1 Further auctions will be held
in 2017 and subsequent years. The purpose of these auctions is to ensure
that there will always be su¢ cient generation capacity available to meet
peak demands for electricity, and energy companies will receive an auction-
determined capacity fee in return for an obligation to deliver energy in periods
of system stress, when capacity margins are tight.
In theory, electricity capacity auctions work in tandem with electricity
spot and forward markets to ensure that energy companies invest in suf-
cient capacity to meet consumer demand for reliability. But economists
disagree about whether electricity markets unlike the markets for breakfast
cereals or new cars require special institutions like government-organized
capacity markets to achieve e¢ cient long-run investments. Those in favour
point to market failuressuch as the lack of demand-side participation in
many electricity markets which makes market clearing problematic in times
of scarcity, or to missing money due to regulatory caps on peak-period
prices, to justify the need for intervention. Excessive price volatility and
coordination failures are further factors which have been adduced in support
of introducing capacity markets.2
Other economists argue that there is nothing special about electricity,
1Department of Energy & Climate Change, Electricity Market Reform: Capacity Mar-
ket  Detailed Design Proposals, June 2013; and Electricity Market Reform: Capacity
Market Update, October 2013.
2P. Cramton and A. Ockenfels, Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the
Power Sector Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 36:113-134, 2012; P. Cramton, A. Ocken-
fels and S. Stoft, Capacity Market Fundamentals, Economics of Energy & Environmental
Policy, 2:2, September 2013; and P. Joskow, Capacity Payments in Imperfect Electricity
Markets: Need and Design, Utilities Policy 16, 159-170, 2008.
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and point to the numerous examples of liberalized electricity markets which
perform well without such measures. They also point out that rather than
reecting consumer preferences for reliability, in reality capacity markets pro-
cure generation resources to satisfy government-mandated levels of supply se-
curity, based on estimates of future demand which often turn out to be wildly
incorrect.3 Some analysts argue that existing capacity markets have failed
to achieve their intended purpose of ensuring a reliable supply of electricity,
despite the high costs they have imposed on consumers.4
Whatever the theoretical pros and cons, policy makers in many coun-
tries are now expressing concerns that liberalized energy markets might not
guarantee reliable long-run supplies of electricity, and the UK government ob-
viously does not believe that the current energy market will deliver enough
new power stations to keep the lights on in the future. We will not enter
into this debate in this article. Rather, given that a capacity market is be-
ing introduced in Britain, we ask whether the auction design currently being
proposed by the DECC is t for its intended purpose. The DECCs capacity
auction is virtually identical to the auction introduced rst in the New Eng-
land ISOs capacity market in 2006, and later for Colombias Firm Energy
market in 2008.5 Experience to date with this auction design has been mixed
at best.
3F. Wolak, Whats Wrong with Capacity Markets?, Stanford University, 2004; F.
Wolak, Economic and Political Constraints on the Demand-Side of Electricity Industry
Re-structuring Processes, Review of Economics and Institutions, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter,
2013; and A. Kleit and R. Michaels, If You Buy the Power, Why Pay for the Powerplant?
Reforming Texas Electricity Markets, Regulation 36:2, Summer 2013.
4For example, American Public Power Association, RTO Capacity Markets and Their
Impacts on Consumers and Public Power, Fact Sheet February 2013; and C. Nelder The
Perils of Electricity Capacity Markets, Green Tech Media, September 2013.
5See P. Cramton and S. Stoft, A Capacity Market that Makes Sense, Electricity Journal,
18, 43-54, August/September 2005; and P. Cramton and S. Stoft, Colombias Firm Energy
Market, Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2007.
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2 The DECCs Auction Design
The DECC proposes to use periodic descending, uniform-price clock auctions
to elicit o¤ers to supply new capacity from generating companies to meet pre-
dicted demand in future years. In a descending clock auction the auctioneer
initially announces a high price for new capacity so that total supply exceeds
demand.6 Price is then progressively reduced until enough capacity o¤ers
are withdrawn so that excess supply is eliminated.7 The minimum price for
which there is still su¢ cient capacity o¤ered to meet demand sets the capac-
ity fee to be paid to all successful suppliers in the auction, including existing
resources. New capacity o¤ered in the auctions will be able to sign 15 year
capacity agreements at the auction clearing price. Existing capacity will have
access to rolling one year agreements at auction-determined prices.
The argument in favour of using a clock auction is that it allows for what
economists call price discovery. The idea is that generating companies
face signicant common valueuncertainty concerning the value of a new
power plant and this uncertainty will lead them to bid conservatively, i.e.
by demanding a higher price for new capacity, to avoid falling victim to the
winners curse.Signicant levels of common value uncertainty could even
induce generating companies not to participate in the auction, if they are
not prepared to face the value risk of constructing a new power plant.8
6The DECC proposes to set the starting price in the rst auction at a multiple of
the cost of a new build open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) plant minus expected electricity
market revenue. This is currently etimated to be £ 75/kW. Department of Energy & Cli-
mate Change, Electricity Market Reform: Consultation on Proposals for Implementation,
October 2013.
7Because the o¤ers in these auctions are for discrete capacity units, the auction may
end with some excess supply as it is not always possible to match demand and supply
exactly at any price.
8A common valueasset is one that all buyers or sellers would value equally if they
shared all of the relevant information to estimate the assets value. Financial assets are
one example, and oil elds are also frequently cited. The winners curse refers to the
phenomenon whereby winning in an auction can be bad news for the winning bidder
because by the very fact of winning she learns that all of the losing buyers (or sellers)
had lower (or higher) estimates of this common value. So it is likely that her estimate
of the common value was overly optimistic. Understanding this in advance, it is optimal
to bid more conservatively in a common value auction (than in a private value one) to
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A clock auction alleviates this problem by allowing bidders to observe
the changing balance of demand and supply during the auction, and to re-
vise their value estimates in light of this information. This reduction of
uncertainty enables bidders to bid more aggressively without fear of the win-
ners curse, because capacity o¤ers can be reduced when a bidder sees a
signicant number of other o¤ers withdrawn from the auction. This can
both reduce costs and improve e¢ ciency. The DECC recognizes that there
may be an increased risk of collusion in a descending clock auction, as com-
pared to a sealed-bid auction, because bidders can observe and respond to
their competitorsbehavior round by round. It nevertheless argues that this
consideration is outweighed by the potential for improved e¢ ciency. As the
DECC puts it, the ability to observe the behaviour of participants in pre-
vious rounds in a descending clock auction, and to adapt bidding behaviour
on this basis, mitigates risk and should increase the likelihood that the most
e¢ cient providers win capacity agreements.9
Price discovery is only relevant, however, if the products in the auction
have common value elements, and if bidders have private information about
these values. While the DECC suggests that common value uncertainty and
price discovery have been key considerations in its decision to adopt the de-
scending clock auction format, there are reasons for doubting that these are
compelling concerns in electricity capacity markets. For generators partici-
pating in a capacity auction, the main source of common value uncertainty
is the future path of electricity prices which determines the revenues they
will receive from selling electricity into spot or forward markets. But it is
far from clear that generators have any useful information to shareabout
this in a descending clock auction: no generation company is likely to have
better, or even di¤erent, information on the future path of electricity prices
avoid winning at a price which is unprotable. See J. Bulow and P. Klemperer, Prices and
the Winners Curse, RAND Journal of Economics, 2002; R. Wilson, Competitive Bidding
with Disparate Information, Management Science, vol. 13(11), pp. 816-820, 1969; and E.
Capen, R. Clapp and W. Campbell, Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, Journal
of Petroleum Technology, vol. 23(6), 641-653, 1971.
9Department of Energy & Climate Change, Electricity Market Reform: Capacity Mar-
ket Detailed Design Proposals, June 2013, p. 26.
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than any other.10 Investment costs, on the other hand, do not exhibit true
common value uncertainty. To the extent that there is uncertainty about
them, it concerns idiosyncratic and private components of companiescosts.
Hence energy companies are unlikely to reevaluate their capacity cost esti-
mates in light of information revealed in an auction. In any event, since
participants do not know the identities of other bidders active in the clock
auction, it is not clear what information about investment costs they could
possibly infer solely from observing the level of excess supply in each round
of the auction.11
3 Experience in Colombia and New England
Whatever one believes about the desirability of price discovery in electricity
capacity auctions, experience from using the clock auction format in Colom-
bia has demonstrated that a much more pressing concern is the opportunity
it provides large bidders to strategically manipulate auction prices by allow-
ing them to see exactly when the withdrawal of a capacity o¤er will end the
auction at an articially high price. In other words, providing information on
the balance of supply and demand during each round of the auction allows
bidders to see the precise point at which they become pivotal, and able
to unilaterally induce a high auction price by strategically adjusting their
bidding behaviour. This supply reduction problem is especially acute when
a relatively small number of large energy companies dominate the markets
for new generation capacity, as is the case in both Colombia and Britain, and
when bids are for discrete capacity units. Moreover, the presence of large bid-
ders with signicant amounts of existing capacity in the auction which will
10For a more detailed discussion of these issues see D. Harbord and M. Pagnozzi, Review
of Colombian Auctions for Firm Energy, 25 November 2008, report for the Colombian
Commission for the Regulation of Energy and Gas. In our conversations with auction
participants in Colombia, all reported that their reserve prices did not (and would not)
change during the auction and that "learning" was not an issue for them.
11P. Cramton and S. Stoft supra note 5 recommended reporting supply by resource type
at the close of each round. This recommendation has never been adopted for capacity
auctions, however.
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receive the auction-clearing price set by new capacity, further exacerbates
the market power problem.
The Colombian Commission for the Regulation of Energy and Gas (CREG)
has now held two capacity auctions using the descending clock auction for-
mat: the rst in May 2008 and the second in December 2011. The 2008
auction ended early at the rst point at which a large bidder could see that
it had become pivotaland able to withdraw one of its o¤ers to set a high
capacity price. To avoid this happening again, in 2011 the CREG adopted
measures to make this strategy harder by reducing the amount of information
on demand and supply revealed to bidders during the auction. This was not
su¢ cient, however, and the auctioneers abandoned the auction after the ini-
tial two rounds and e¤ectively held a sealed-bid auction in its place.12 They
subsequently recommended changing the auction format to a combinatorial
clock auction followed by a sealed-bid stage to reduce the risk of this being
repeated in the future.13
We know less about the New England experience, but it also suggests
problems. The rst seven auctions from 2007-2013 concluded at the auc-
tion oor price of $3.15/kW-month with a signicant excess supply. Given
the large amounts of excess capacity and the articial price oors, the out-
comes of these auctions provide little information about their performance.
Prior to the 2014 auction however, the price oor was abolished and sig-
nicant amounts of generation capacity were withdrawn from the market.
The eighth auction thus commenced at a starting price of $15.82/kW-month
and concluded after a single round at a clearing price of $15.00/kW-month,
when a generator withdrew its capacity from the auction.14 This suggests an
12The Colombian experience is detailed in our report Second Review of Firm Energy
Auctions in Colombia by D. Harbord and M. Pagnozzi, 18 December 2012, for the Colom-
bian Commission for the Regulation of Energy and Gas.
13S. Dinkin and P. Cramton, Subasta para la Asignación de Obligaciones de Energía
Firme: Auctioneers Report, Full Spectrum Auctions Inc., 5 January 2012.
14Peak Oil News Big numbers for New England Electricity auction might not be enough
to bring new capacity,18 February 2014; Business Wire Auction Ends with Slight Short-
fall in Power System Resources Needed for 20172018 in New England,5 February 2014.
For the New England ISOs o¢ cial auction results see Forward Capacity Market (FCA
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outcome comparable to the Colombian experience in which a single pivotal
bidder was able to withdraw capacity to set a high price early in the auction.
Unlike the DECCs proposal to pay both new and existing capacity the
auction clearing price, however, under the New England rules only 1,370
MW of new resources will receive the $15 price. Existing resources (with the
exception of the constrained region around Boston) will be paid a $7.025/kW-
month price ceiling. Decoupling the prices paid to new versus existing capac-
ity is a potentially important market power mitigation measure, especially
when most of the new capacity o¤ered in the auction is likely to come from
a relatively small number of energy companies which already own the lions
share of extant capacity.
4 Auction Design Choices
Experience in both Colombia and New England provides a stark warning
about the dangers of placing descending clock auctions at the centre of elec-
tricity capacity markets. The problems experienced in Colombia are endemic
to descending clock auctions for generation with large, indivisible capacity
bids so similar problems will likely arise in the UK, particularly since in both
markets generation is dominated by a handful of large companies. While not
identical to Colombias, New Englands experience raises further questions
about the e¢ cacy of the DECCs current auction design.
In our second report for the Colombian Commission for the Regulation
of Energy and Gas we considered three possible options for addressing these
market power issues:
 an increase in the amount of demand uncertainty faced by bidders in
the auction;
 the use of a combinatorial clock auction; or
 adoption of a sealed-bid uniform-price or discriminatory-price auction.
8) Result Report 7 February 2014.
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We discuss each of these options briey in turn.
4.1 Increased Demand Uncertainty
Demand uncertainty can be increased either by introducing a random compo-
nent in demand, so that reported information on excess supply is su¢ ciently
uncertain to make price manipulation strategies more risky, or by allowing
the auctioneer to reduce demand after observing the bids submitted in any
round.15 It is important to recall, however, that the primary rationale for
using a descending clock auction is price discovery, and as we reduce the
amount of information provided during the auction, or increase uncertainty
about it, we are reducing the opportunities for learning being provided to
bidders. Hence signicant reductions in the information provided, or intro-
ducing signicant degrees of uncertainty, violate the spirit of the entire enter-
prise. It thus makes little sense to address the problem of pivotal bidders in
clock auctions by progressively increasing demand uncertainty parameters,
or reducing opportunities for price discovery in other ways.
4.2 Combinatorial Clock Auction
Combinatorial clock auctions are used to sell radio spectrum to telecommu-
nications companies in a number of countries. They are dynamic auctions
that allow bidders to bid on packages of objects.16 The auction begins with
a clockstage in which prices increase for objects with excess demand, until
there is no excess demand for any object. This is followed by a sealed-bid
round, in which bidders can increase their bids on packages on which they
have previously bid and submit new bids on other packages.17 All of the bids
15See D. McAdams, Adjustable Supply in Uniform Price Auctions: Non-Commitment
as a Strategic Tool, Economics Letters, 95(1) 48-53, 2007.
16L. Ausubel, P. Cramton and P. Milgrom, The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Com-
binatorial Auction Design, in Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auc-
tions, Chapter 5, 115-138, MIT Press, 2006; L. Ausubel and P. Milgrom, Ascending Auc-
tions with Package Bidding, Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1:1, 2002.
17See P. Cramton, Spectrum Auction Design, Review of Industrial Organization, 42:2,
161-190, 2013 for a more detailed discussion of this auction design.
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are then used to determine the value-maximizing assignment of objects on
sale. It is an appropriate design for auctions in which bidders have hetero-
geneous, but similar objects to sell and there are complementarities between
them, as it allows bidders to avoid the "exposure" problem.18
Electricity capacity or rm energy auctions are for a single, potentially di-
visible, product - generation capacity in GWh - hence in this case it is unlikely
that a combinatorial auction would result in any signicant improvements in
e¢ ciency. A combinatorial auction could in principle be useful where bidders
have decreasing marginal costs of production from a single generating plant,
so are willing to sell larger quantities at a lower per unit price than a smaller
quantity. But combinatorial auctions introduce a number of additional com-
plications. For example, a particular and typically complex pricing rule must
be chosen. The second-price rule adopted in a number of combinatorial
spectrum auctions has some undesirable properties. It may lead to larger
companies being paid higher prices than smaller ones for identical quantities
of energy, and it makes it very di¢ cult for bidders to anticipate how their
bids will a¤ect the nal auction prices, which may make them unwilling to
bid truthfully. Moreover, an activity rule must be designed for the clock stage
of the auction, and there is no agreement to date over the most appropriate
one.19
Hence, the additional cost in complexity created by a combinatorial auc-
tion, both in terms of implementation by the auctioneer and choice of bidding
strategies by participants, likely outweighs any advantages in resolving issues
to do with economies of scale or cost complementarities.
18The exposure problem refers to the risk that, with complementarities in valuations,
bidders win some, but not all, of the objects they want, and hence pay a price that is
higher than their valuation for the objects that they actually win.
19L. Ausubel and P. Cramton, Activity Rules for the Combinatorial Clock Auction,
Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2011.
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4.3 Sealed-Bid Uniform-Price or Discriminatory-Price
Auction
Since price discovery does not seem to play any signicant role from the point
of view of the bidders in capacity auctions, a sealed-bid auction appears to
be the best solution. In this auction format bidders submit sealed bids that
represent their supply functions  i.e. the lowest prices at which they are
willing to sell di¤erent quantities of capacity  and the quantity acquired
by the auctioneer equates bidderstotal supply to the auctioneers demand.
The two most commonly used multi-object sealed-bid auctions for a ho-
mogeneous divisible good such as generation capacity are the uniform-price
("pay-as-clear") and the discriminatory-price ("pay-as-bid") auction. In a
uniform-price auction all capacity is sold by winning bidders at the same
market-clearing price, while in a discriminatory-price auction each winning
bidder is paid its own bid for the quantities that it sells.
Arguably, the main advantage of a uniform-price auction is that it satises
the law of one price. Since all capacity is sold at the same price, no bidder
is paid more than any other for an identical good. This makes bidding
particularly straightforward for small bidders who can simply bid their own
valuations and receive the auction determined market-clearing price. In a
discriminatory-price auction, on the other hand, winners are paid their own
bids so need to have good information about the distribution of their rivals
valuations in order to determine an optimal bidding strategy. Hence bidding
in these auctions can be especially complex for small bidders.
A potential disadvantage of uniform-price auctions is that they may have
multiple Nash equilibria, in some of which bidders implicitly coordinate on
high prices, by o¤ering extremely low prices for quantities smaller than their
equilibrium share.20 These high-price equilibria exist when the quantity de-
manded by the auctioneer is xed and bidders can submit continuous supply
functions. However, the auctioneer can reduce them by demanding a random
quantity, or it can eliminate them altogether by maintaining the exibility
20R. Wilson, Auctions of Shares, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 93, pp. 675-689,
1979.
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to adjust its demand after receiving biddersbids.21 Moreover, high-price
equilibria do not arise if bids are discrete, as in almost all actual auctions,
and the quantity demanded is random or uncertain.22
In discriminatory auctions coordinated supply reduction resulting in high-
price equilibria is less of a problem because each bidder receives its actual
bid for the quantity that it sells.23 This is probably the main advantage of a
discriminatory-price auction compared to a uniform-price auction.
The academic literature on discriminatory-price and uniform-price auc-
tions nds neither auction format for sealed-bid multi-object auctions to be
unambiguously superior to the other.24 The empirical evidence is also incon-
clusive. On balance, the advantages of a uniform-price auction in terms of
price uniqueness and simplicity for small bidders probably makes it a prefer-
able choice over a discriminatory-price auction, especially since uncertainty
about competitorsstrategies and the actual market-clearing price generated
by a sealed-bid auction will likely be su¢ cient to discourage bidders from
strategically manipulating their bids.
Choice of price in a uniform-price auction A nal issue is the choice
of price in a uniform-price auction. With discrete bids or supply functions,
there is some exibility in the denition of a market-clearing price: any
price between the highest winning (or accepted) bid and the lowest losing
(or rejected) bid can equate demand and supply. Moreover, because of the
indivisibility of bids these auctions will generically terminate with either
excess supply or excess demand.
In a sealed-bid auction, setting price equal to the highest accepted bid
may increase biddersincentive to strategically reduce supply. The incentive
21P. Klemperer and M. Meyer, Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncer-
tainty, Econometrica, vol. 58(1), pp. 15-41, 1989; D. McAdams supra note 15.
22I. Kremer, and K. Nyborg, Divisible Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules,
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 35(1), 2004.
23K. Back and J. Zender, Auctions of Divisible Goods, Review of Financial Studies, vol.
6, pp. 733-764, 1993.
24N. Fabra, N.-H. von der Fehr and D. Harbord, Designing Electricity Auctions, RAND
Journal of Economics, vol. 37 (1), pp. 23-46, 2006.
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to unilaterally reduce supply stems from the fact that, if a bid is pivotal,
it a¤ects the price paid to all capacity accepted in the auction, so bidders
have an incentive to increase their bids even though this may reduce the
quantity they sell.25 By contrast, if the auction price is set equal to the
lowest rejected bid, increasing a bid will increase the auction price only if
this bid is rejected. Hence, a bidder may increase the price it is paid for
its other winning plants only by increasing its bid for a losing plant; but a
bid for a specic plant or unit will never a¤ect the price paid for the energy
produced by that plant. Therefore, bidders will perceive a lower incentive to
reduce supply in a uniform-price auction when the auction price is equal to
the lowest rejected bid
Choosing a market-clearing price equal to the lowest rejected bid may
appear to be the preferable option. However, for any given set of bids, an
auction price equal to the lowest rejected bid increases the price paid by the
auctioneer for all of the capacity that it purchases, and nothing guarantees
that this price di¤erential will be small.26
5 Conclusion
The jury is still out on the need for government-organized capacity markets
in order to achieve e¢ cient long-run investments in electricity generation.
When new capacity markets are introduced however, it is important that
they be well designed and take account of existing experience and previous
design failures. Experience in both Colombia and New England provide a
25With indivisible bids, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that the marginal win-
ning bid can sometimes be increased without a¤ecting the quantity sold by the marginal
winning plant. See D. Harbord and M. Pagnozzi supra note 12 for a discussion of this
issue.
26See Department of Energy & Climate Change, Electricity Market Reform Capacity
Market Update, October 2013, Annex A for a discussion. We might have also considered
multi-unit Vickrey auctions for capacity, but these are signicantly more complex, do not
result in a uniform price, and face other well-known di¢ culties (see N. Fabra, N.-H. von
der Fehr and D. Harbord, Modelling Electricity Auctions, Electricity Journal, Vol. 15, No.
7, pp. 72-81, 2002).
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stark warning about the dangers of placing descending clock auctions at the
centre of electricity capacity markets. The problems experienced in Colombia
are endemic to descending clock auctions for generation with large, indivisible
capacity bids so similar problems will likely arise in the UK, particularly since
in both markets generation is dominated by a handful of large companies.
While not identical to Colombias, New Englands experience raises further
questions about the e¢ cacy of the DECCs current auction design.
Somewhat paradoxically, the Department of Energy & Climate Change
is simultaneously proposing to use either a discriminatory or uniform price
sealed-bid auction to allocate contracts for di¤erences to renewable, low-
carbon energy projects,27 despite the fact that the case for a descending
clock auction is arguably much stronger for these newer technologies.28 A
sealed-bid auction format should be considered for the technology-neutral
capacity market as well.
While there are a number of design options for multi-unit sealed-bid auc-
tions, uniform price auctions have the advantage of making bidding simple,
thus encouraging the entry of smaller bidders into the market. It is less clear
whether the uniform price should be set by the highest accepted or the low-
est rejected bid, however regulatory authorities nd it notoriously di¢ cult
to explain why an auction should pay higher prices to winning bidders than
seems strictly necessary, especially when these di¤erences can be large.
27Department of Energy & Climate Change, Electricity Market Reform: Allocation of
Contracts for Di¤erence Consultation on Competitive Allocation, 16 January 2014.
28See Policy Exchange, Going, Going, Gone: The role of auctions and competition in
renewable electricity support, 16 December 2013.
13
